We identify two features of final offer arbitration (FOA) which may impede settlement in a bargaining game where asymmetric information drives the failure to settle. First, under FOA the informed party has an incentive not to voluntarily reveal private information. Revealing this information allows the previously uninformed party to submit a superior offer to the arbitrator to the detriment of the informed party. Second, in a two-type model, the uninformed player may choose to arbitrate all cases, a result which never occurs in a simple litigation game. Such a strategy allows this player to commit to an offer in arbitration that is optimal against the entire distribution of types with whom he must bargain. Each player's offer directly affects the outcome of arbitration under FOA, and it is this feature that generates impediments to settlement that are not observed in a simple litigation game. Both impediments to settlement are removed if bargaining is allowed to take place after potentially binding offers have been submitted to the arbitrator.
Introduction
Bargaining failure may result in costly strikes or trials. One of the leading explanations of bargaining failure is that there exists asymmetric information between the parties to the dispute. 1 If this explanation is correct, then differences in settlement rates across bargaining institutions may largely reflect differences in the strategic incentives generated by these institutions. In particular, alternative institutional structures may affect the aggressiveness with which offers are made and the incentives to voluntarily reveal private information to a bargaining partner. We will explore these two issues in the context of final offer arbitration (FOA) and will compare the outcomes of this institution to a baseline alternative which may either be viewed as a simple litigation game or as a simple model of conventional arbitration (CA). 2 Under FOA in the absence of a bargaining agreement, each party to a dispute submits a final offer to an arbitrator, who must choose one of the two submitted offers. By contrast, under CA, the arbitrator may impose whatever settlement she sees fit. FOA is most famously used in major league baseball, but is used in many other contexts, including some public sector negotiations (where strikes are not permitted), the settlement of rate disputes between Canadian railroads and their customers, and in worker's compensation cases in California.
A key feature of FOA is that the offers submitted to the arbitrator directly affect the expected outcome through their influence on the arbitrator's decision. In choosing an offer, a player affects both the probability that the offer is chosen as well as their payoff conditional on the offer being chosen. There is no analogous feature in a simple litigation game. It is this ability to affect the outcome that alters players' strategies in ways that might impede settlement.
The most important contribution of the current paper is our analysis of the incentive to voluntarily transmit private information under FOA. In a simple litigation model, Shavell (1989) finds that when information is verifiable and revelation is costless, in equilibrium all private information will be revealed. 3 However, we find that the use of FOA may impede the voluntary transmission of private information. The reason is that an informed player can submit a more appropriate offer to the arbitrator and therefore improve their prospects at the arbitration hearing.
This provides a disincentive for an informed plaintiff to voluntarily reveal her information to an uninformed defendant thereby equipping him with the knowledge to place a more profitable final offer. This disincentive does not exist in a simple litigation game where the players' actions cannot affect the outcome at trial. In FOA this disincentive disappears if negotiations (and information revelation) take place after potentially binding offers are submitted to the arbitrator.
Once the uninformed party has committed to an offer, informed plaintiffs with strong cases lose nothing by revealing their private information. 4 Our other results concern the incentive to settle in a baseline model of FOA, where voluntary revelation of private information is not possible. Consider a simple litigation game,
where an informed plaintiff can be one of two types: those with weak or strong cases. If the defendant is given the power to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer, there are two potential strategies he might undertake. He may choose an offer high enough to induce settlement with both types of plaintiffs (and avoid court costs), or he may choose a low offer which only plaintiffs with weak cases accept, resulting in trials with plaintiffs with strong cases. He will never make an offer that is unattractive to both types; in doing this he would incur additional court costs without generating any corresponding benefit.
However, under FOA the uninformed "defendant" (i.e., person making the payment) may strictly prefer to go to arbitration with both types. Once in arbitration, the uninformed defendant submits an offer that reflects his updated beliefs about the "plaintiff's" type, conditional on the settlement that occurred in prior negotiations. If all weak cases settle, then the sequentially rational offer the defendant submits to the arbitrator will reflect the presence of only strong plaintiff types in arbitration. It turns out that this offer harms the defendant's bargaining position with weak types who settle prior to arbitration. As a result, the uninformed defendant may prefer to proceed to arbitration against both types of plaintiffs despite the additional costs, because doing so will allow him to commit to a sequentially rational offer which is optimal given the entire distribution of types with whom he must bargain.
The uninformed party's desire to commit to an optimal offer at arbitration may impede settlement. Since the outcome of a trial is unaffected by player's strategies, this commitment issue does not arise in a simple litigation game, and has not been previously identified in the literature. 5 However, if under FOA negotiations are permitted to continue subsequent to the submission of binding offers to the arbitrator but prior to the arbitration hearing, this commitment issue disappears, and the results of the simple litigation game are restored; the defendant never proceeds to trial with weak plaintiffs.
In Farmer and Pecorino (1998) , we analyze a two-type model of FOA in which there is negotiation subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator and compare it to a baseline game where all negotiations take place prior to the submission of such offers. In the equilibrium where some sorting among types occurs, we find that adding a round of negotiations subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator reduces the incidence of arbitration. However, the pooling equilibrium under which all cases settle is less likely in this version of the game. Thus, this added round of negotiations has an ambiguous overall effect on the incidence of bargaining failure. The results of the current paper complement this earlier work by suggesting additional avenues through which negotiations subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator affect settlement incentives under FOA.
The bulk of our previous paper focused on the game where negotiation takes place subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator. As shown in Section 5, 'settle with none'
is never an equilibrium in this game. Thus, our previous analysis of this game is complete.
However, for the baseline game where all negotiation takes place prior to the submission of offers to the arbitrator, we only considered the equilibria 'settle with all' and 'settle with weak plaintiffs'. For appropriate parameter values, the baseline game also contains 'settle with none' as an equilibrium, but our previous analysis failed to consider this case. 6 The possibility of a 'settle with none' equilibrium in the baseline model increases the presumption that there is greater settlement in the game with negotiation subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator.
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This presumption is further reinforced by the major findings of the current paper, which are that strategic considerations impede the voluntary transmission of private information and that this impediment is eliminated once negotiations (and information revelation) can take place after offers are submitted to the arbitrator.
As discussed in the conclusion, once endogenous expenditure at trial or conditional shifting of court costs (as under Rule 68) are added to a simple litigation model, the issues raised in this paper may become relevant for models of civil litigation. Thus, the analysis in this paper may have a fairly broad area of application to models of dispute settlement.
A Simple Model of Litigation
For the purpose of comparison with FOA, we will discuss settlement in a simple litigation game between a plaintiff and a defendant. 
The Game Without Information Revelation
The decision for the plaintiff is simple; accept an offer if and only if it is greater than or equal to her expected payoff at trial. Consider the following offers: 
, from each of these strategies are as follows:
By comparing expected cost of each strategy, we can determine the defendant's optimal offer and the equilibrium probability of trial. This leads to the result found in the following proposition:
Proposition 2.1: The defendant will never choose an offer that results in trial against both types of plaintiffs.
Proof: By comparing (b) with (c), we can see that the defendant will never want to go to trial against all plaintiffs, because it is always true that (b)<(c).
Given that the defendant will never opt for trial versus both types of plaintiffs, what will the offer It is worth noting that an equilibrium in which type H players reveal their information and type L players do not can be supported in a similar fashion. In this equilibrium, the private information of type L players is revealed by their silence. Now consider an alternative equilibrium in which information is not revealed by either type of plaintiff. The analysis of this game is identical to that given in section 2.1. There are two possible equilibria in the standard litigation game without information revelation: 1) The defendant makes a high offer and settles with everyone or 2) The defendant makes an offer that a type L will accept, and proceeds to litigation with type H players who reject this offer. In this model, equilibria with and without information revelation can both be supported. In part, this is an artifact of the assumption that the defendant makes a take it or leave it offer to the plaintiff, thereby extracting the entire joint surplus from settlement. 8 In a more realistic bargaining framework, a player with a good case who reveals her private information would be able to obtain part of the joint surplus from settlement. Absent a pooling equilibrium, type H players would have a strict incentive to reveal their information to capture a share of the joint surplus from settlement, while type L players would be revealed by their silence (Shavell 1989 ).
Proposition 2.3: An equilibrium exists in which neither type reveals their information.
Thus we would either have a pooling equilibrium or have voluntary revelation of private information. In either event, all cases would settle prior to trial.
Final Offer Arbitration

The game without voluntary information revelation
We consider a game with asymmetric information in which player 1, who is to receive a payment from player 2, has private information over the arbitrator's valuation of the dispute. In the litigation model we referred to player 1 and 2 as plaintiff and defendant, but this terminology is inappropriate in the context of arbitration. As before, player 1 is denoted type H if her private information indicates the arbitrator's preferred settlement, Y, is to be drawn from the high distribution and type L if it is to be drawn from the low distribution. We assume that player 2 knows that the arbitrator's preferred settlement is drawn from the high distribution with probability p and from the low distribution with probability 1-p.
The game is as follows:
0. Nature determines Player 1's type, H or L, with probabilities p and 1-p respectively.
1a. Player 1 decides whether or not to costlessly reveal her type to player 2.
1b. Player 2, the uninformed party, makes an offer to player 1. If the offer is accepted, the game ends. If it is rejected, the game proceeds to stage 2.
2. Both players submit offers (b 1 and b 2 ) to the arbitrator.
3. The arbitrator chooses the offer that is closer to his preferred value, Y. Denote this choice by V. Player 1's net payoff is V-C 1 and player 2's net cost is V+C 2 .
Initially, we will consider the game without stage 1a, but will later analyze the incentives for voluntary revelation of information in this game.
Stage 3: The Arbitrator's Decision
The arbitrator chooses Player 1 chooses b 1 to maximize:
where the superscript i = H,L indicates the true distribution. Note that, in general, the optimal offer for player 1 would depend upon the offer submitted to the arbitrator by player 2, so that the reaction functions would be written ) ( Player 2 will choose his offer to minimize:
Player 2's offer is written most generally as
, where γ is player 2's belief that his opponent is type H, conditional on her having proceeded to arbitration. However, for the case we examine below, player 2's optimal offer will depend on the distribution of player types encountered in arbitration, but not their offers. Thus, we will write b 2 (γ) throughout the paper. 
is the optimal (expected cost minimizing) offer by player 2 to a type H player 1. Any other offer must lead to a higher expected cost. Similarly,
offer against a type L player. When γ=p, player 2 submits an offer that is not optimal against either type individually, but which is optimal against a weighted average of each type. As a consequence, player 1 fares better when player 2 is uninformed at point where he (player 2)
submits his offer to the arbitrator.
In addition to benefiting from player 2's lack of information, player 1 receives the greatest expected payoff when player 2 has the wrong information. If player 2 submits ) 1 ( . These cases will be relevant only when considering deviations from equilibrium behavior by player 1. To summarize, we have Player 2 has three options to consider in making his settlement offer to player 1. He can make a high offer that both player types will accept. Second, he can make a low offer that only type L players will accept; type H players will reject this offer and arbitration will result. Finally, he can make a very low offer that will be rejected by both players. As a result, all cases will proceed to arbitration. The expected costs to player 2 of each of these strategies are
Settle with all:
Settle with L only:
Settle with none: Even in a standard litigation model, there will be indifference between trial and settlement when trial costs are 0. However, this indifference disappears as soon as costs rise above zero. Here we have a strict preference for arbitration when costs are zero, so that this preference will be preserved for positive costs sufficiently close to zero. Taking both player types to arbitration allows player 2 to commit to the offer ) ( 
Incentives to Reveal Information
Now consider the addition of stage 1a to the game above. This added step provides the opportunity for player 1 to costlessly reveal her type. In the basic litigation model of section 2.2, we find that equilibria with complete information revelation and no information revelation can both be supported. However, in final offer arbitration, we find that there are no equilibria under which information is voluntarily revealed, because of strategic incentives on the part of the informed player to conceal such information. In a standard litigation model, once a trial occurs all private information is revealed, and the judgment reflects that information. The player with private information extracts nothing more by having the information revealed in front of the judge than could be extracted by having that information revealed voluntarily prior to trial and negotiating a settlement on the basis of this information. 11 In final offer arbitration, the arbitrator is forced to choose one of the players' offers, so these offers are meaningful in terms of the final judgment. Thus, each player's payoff is not merely a reflection of the private information revealed at the hearing, but is also a function of both players' actions. Since these actions (offers) are a function of each player's information, it is possible that the player with private information can affect the final outcome by withholding her private information until the time of the hearing. As we will see later in the paper, the incentive to withhold information exists until the potentially binding offers have been submitted to the arbitrator.
The result that no information is voluntarily revealed in the arbitration game stems in part from the assumed bargaining structure under which player 2 obtains all of the joint surplus from settlement. In a bargaining framework in which both parties share the joint surplus from settlement, the strategic gains from concealing information must be offset against the share of the joint surplus that may be obtained via the voluntary disclosure of private information. While in practice, the strategic advantage from concealing private information in the arbitration game may not always dominate the gains from voluntary revelation, the crucial point is that there are no strategic incentives for concealment in the standard litigation model.
Proposition 3.2: There does not exist an equilibrium under which player 1 reveals her private information.
Proof: Note that type H players who reveal their private information receive an offer
, while type L players who reveal their private information receive the offer From the analysis above, we conclude that there is no equilibrium under which either player type reveals her private information. In contrast, full information revelation under which all cases settle prior to trial is a supportable equilibrium in the standard litigation model.
Similarly, if his strategy is to submit b 2 (γ=1), then type L players will deviate from equilibrium since by (5b),
)) 1 ( , ( 2 1 = γ π b b L L > )) 0 ( , ( 2 1 = γ π b b L L .1 2 1 )) 0 ( , ( C b b L L − = γ π . Again,
Numerical Example
In this section, we develop a simple numerical example to illustrate the interesting properties of the model discussed in section 3. In particular, we would like to show that under FOA, player 2 may strictly prefer to force all cases to arbitration by making a low initial offer, and that player 1 may strictly prefer to conceal her private information when presented with an opportunity to disclose it costlessly. For the purpose of this example, we assume that distribution L is uniform over [0, 1] , distribution H is uniform over [.5, 1.5] and that that H distribution is drawn with probability p=.2. Thus, 2 
Recall that in arbitration, player 1's offer will be selected with probability 1-F i . We assume costs of arbitration C 1 = C 2 = .04. These costs sum to 16% of the mean of the L distribution.
From the optimization of equations (3) and (4), it is possible to verify the following offer functions for the players:
These offer functions reflect the linearity of the uniform solution in that they are essentially corner solutions. For player 1, the optimal offer is always the upper endpoint of the uniform distribution. For player 2, the optimal offer is a weighted average of the optimal offers when player types are known with certainty. The optimal offer against type L players ( 0 = γ ) is 0, while the optimal offer against type H players ( 1 = γ ) is .5.
The three relevant strategies for player 2 are to (i) settle with both (ii) settle with type L only and (iii) settle with none. 
Negotiations After Offers Are Submitted to the Arbitrator
We now wish to consider the game where negotiation is allowed subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator. This game is specified as follows:
1. Player 2, the uninformed party, makes an offer to player 1. If the offer is accepted, the game ends. If it is rejected, the game proceeds to stage 2.
3a. Player 1 decides whether or not to costlessly reveal her type to player 2.
3b. Player 2 makes a final offer to player 1. If the offer is accepted, the game ends. If the offer is rejected, the game proceeds to the arbitration phase.
4. The arbitrator chooses the offer that is closer to his preferred value, Y. Denote this choice by V. Player 1's net payoff is V-C 1 and player 2's net cost is V+C 2 .
We will first consider the game in which the voluntary transmission of information is not possible (there is no stage 3a), and next will consider the effects from adding this stage.
The game without voluntary information revelation
We will not fully characterize the equilibrium of this game, as this discussion would be lengthy and fairly complicated. The reader is referred to Farmer and Pecorino (1998) . 12 Rather, this subsection will establish a necessary property of an equilibrium to this game as summarized in the following proposition: 
[ ]
Settle with none:
Subtract (8b) from (8c) to get (1-Γ)(C 1 +C 2 ). It follows that (8c) >(8b). Thus, player 2 will never choose a strategy (settle with none) that involves arbitration with type L players. Since this is true for an arbitrary set of offers, it must be true for the offers made in equilibrium.
Intuitively, by going to arbitration against both types, player 2 forgoes extracting the cost of arbitration C 1 from type L players and must incur his own cost of arbitration C 2 against both type L and type H players rather than only against type H players as in (8b). In contrast with the simple model of FOA developed in section 3, there are no gains to offset these losses;
mathematically, the arguments of the π functions are the same in (8b) and (8c). By contrast, compare (6b) with (6c), where these arguments do differ.
In the earlier game, player 2 may choose to go to arbitration with both types of players because it allows player 2 to commit to an offer, b 2 (γ=p) , which is optimal given the entire population with whom he must bargain. By contrast, to settle with type L's prior to arbitration, player 2 must bargain in the face of an offer b 2 (γ=1) which reflects the exclusive presence of type H players at the arbitration stage. However, when negotiation occurs after submission of offers to the arbitrator, this motive for going to arbitration with type L players disappears; once the offers have been submitted to the arbitrator, commitment to an optimal offer has been achieved, and there is nothing to be gained by inducing type L players to proceed to arbitration.
The game with voluntary revelation of private information
We now consider the game with step 3a; after both sides submit offers to the arbitrator, player 1 may voluntarily reveal her private information. Our goal here is not to discuss all possible equilibria which can result in this game, as that discussion would be quite lengthy.
Importantly, we establish here that information revelation is one equilibrium to this game, while it was not an equilibrium in the game without negotiation subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator. Given the bargaining structure in which player 2 can extract all the surplus of settlement from player 1, there may exist also equilibria that involve no information revelation.
In contrast, proposition 3.2 established that in the simpler arbitration game, private information is never voluntarily revealed. We have the following proposition: Note that it is also an equilibrium for both type H and type L players to reveal their private information. To support that equilibrium, out of equilibrium beliefs are specified such that if player 1 fails to disclose her information, player 2 assumes that she is type L.
In the arbitration game studied in section 3, voluntary information transmission was hampered by the knowledge that player 2 would use this information to change his offer submitted to the arbitrator in a manner detrimental to player 1. In the current game, we consider the possibility of voluntary transmission of private information after potentially binding offers have been submitted to the arbitrator. Since player 2 has committed to an offer, there is no longer any harm to player 1 caused by revealing her private information.
Stage 3 of the game where negotiations take place subsequent to the submission of offers to the arbitrator, is structurally similar to the simple litigation game analyzed in section 2. Player actions from this point in the game forward can have no effect on the expected payoff at arbitration for type L and type H players. Thus we have a restoration of two properties of the simple litigation model; type L players always settle prior to arbitration and voluntary revelation of private information is a possible equilibrium outcome of the game.
If we relax the assumption that player 2 is able to extract the entire surplus from player 1 through his settlement offer, we expect all equilibria to result in 100% settlement. It has already been established in proposition 5.1 that type L players will never go to arbitration in equilibrium.
This result is not sensitive to the details of the bargaining structure. Further, any equilibrium with type H players proceeding to arbitration would beak down, since these players have a strict incentive to reveal their information in order to obtain part of the joint surplus of settlement. A pooling equilibrium is possible. Under this equilibrium, all players submit an offer associated with a type H player, receive an acceptable final offer and settle. The other possible equilibria involve information revelation as in proposition 5.2 or a very similar outcome in which type L players also reveal their information. In all of these equilibria, there is a 100% settlement rate.
Conclusion
There are two aspects of FOA that may impede settlement. The desire of the uninformed party to commit to an optimal offer at arbitration may lead him to take (in our two type model) both player types to arbitration. This phenomenon does not occur in the standard litigation game or in a version of CA in which offers do not affect the arbitration outcome. In addition, the use of FOA may discourage the voluntary revelation of private information. This occurs because a more informed opponent submits a better offer to the arbitrator to the detriment of the player who revealed her private information. Both of these impediments to settlement disappear when negotiations take place subsequent to the submission of potentially binding offers to the arbitrator. This suggests that the inclusion of such a phase is important if the goal is to limit the incidence of bargaining failure under FOA.
While the issues discussed above do not arise in a simple litigation game, they may arise in a litigation game with asymmetric information in which legal expenditure affects the probable outcome at trial. 13 In such a game, the decision about how much to spend at trial takes on a role similar to the decision of which offer to submit to the arbitrator under FOA. A potentially interesting area for future research is to analyze the incentives for voluntary transmission of private information in a model of endogenous legal expenditure.
14 In models of conditional cost shifting, the shifting of certain court costs and legal fees may depend upon the relationship between pretrial offers and the outcome at trial. 15 For example, under Rule 68, court costs are shifted to the plaintiff if the judgment she receives at trial falls short of a Rule 68 offer submitted by the defendant prior to trial. As with FOA, in such models, we should expect inhibitions against the voluntary transmission of private information.
Structurally, these games are similar to FOA in that pretrial offers affect the expected outcome at trial and may therefore reflect private information, or be affected by private information which has been voluntarily revealed.
As the discussion above indicates, the insights provided by this paper may have a fairly broad area of application in the dispute resolution literature. 8 If we give the power to make an offer to the informed party, we will have a signaling game. An analysis of a signaling game version of our model would be vastly more complicated than our analysis of the screening game.
9 This analysis follows Farber (1980 ; i.e., player 2 will win more often against the type L player. Thus, the expected cost on the left hand side is strictly less than that on the right.
11 While we are considering voluntary revelation of private information, in a model with pretrial discovery, agents may be forced to make involuntary information disclosures. See, among others, the work of Sobel (1989) and Hay (1995) .
12 Sequential bargaining in a litigation game is analyzed by Spier (1992) . 13 See among others, the work of Braeutigam Owen, and Panzar (1984) , Katz (1988) and Pecorino (1999) .
14 There is at least one important difference between FOA and legal expenditure at trial. Legal expenditure at trial affects the outcome at trial, but also imposes a direct cost to the party making the expenditure. While an offer submitted under FOA affects the outcome at arbitration, it does not directly imposes costs on the party making the offer.
